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## Integration, Inequality, and Imperatives of Justice: A Review Essay

### I. INTRODUCTION

Black Americans continue to be a disadvantaged group in the United States. Compared to whites or Asians, they are, on average, significantly worse off with respect to wealth, income, educational achievement, employment, life expectancy, and other indicators of well-being. Some—for instance, those who reside in racially segregated and severely disadvantaged metropolitan neighborhoods (sometimes called “ghettos”)—are particularly bad off. These deep, pervasive, and long-standing inequalities also have negative repercussions for black political empowerment and civic inclusion.

Despite such continuing and salient disadvantages, blacks’ charges of injustice are frequently dismissed as lacking merit. Racism and discrimination are widely viewed as no longer affecting black life chances, and blacks’ disadvantages are regularly attributed to the failings of blacks themselves.<sup>1</sup> This trend toward postracial ideology notwithstanding, some people remain steadfast in their conviction that existing racial inequalities represent social injustices that urgently demand remedy. Among these are many who believe that aggressive enforcement of anti-discrimination laws, an expansion of economic and educational opportunities, a more equitable distribution of income and wealth, and

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1. Lawrence D. Bobo, “Somewhere between Jim Crow and Post-Racialism: Reflections on the Racial Divide in America Today,” *Daedalus* 140 (2011): 11–36.

perhaps reparations are adequate responses to these injustices. However, some are convinced that such measures would be insufficient or are infeasible and thus seek to revive the ideal of racial integration.<sup>2</sup>

With her important book *The Imperative of Integration* (2010), Elizabeth Anderson joins this latter group, making a vigorous, complex, and sophisticated case for racial integration in all spheres of social life.<sup>3</sup> She regards the plight of blacks as an especially worrisome instance of the broader problem of group-based disadvantage and undemocratic group interaction. Segregation is, she thinks, the “linchpin” of contemporary racial inequality, and she maintains that this problem extends far beyond the black poor, since middle-class blacks are also disadvantaged by segregation (p. 27).

Anderson does not offer one master argument but rather provides a number of interrelated, empirically driven considerations. Some of these rest on a controversial theory of democracy (chap. 5), which I will not engage.<sup>4</sup> I will limit myself to her central claim that rectifying unjust material inequalities requires integration. Anderson’s impressive synthesis of a vast array of empirical studies and her resulting social analysis are, in many ways, compelling and informative. I am not, however, persuaded that integration, as she conceives it, is a requirement of justice. Her conclusions about the need for integration can seem attractive and even inescapable when compared to “color-blind” principles, radical black separatism, or liberal multiculturalism. Yet, there is a left-wing, pluralist alternative that not only survives her critique but is, I will argue, superior to her vision of racial justice.

2. See, for example, Orlando Patterson, *The Ordeal of Integration* (New York: Basic Books, 1997); Sheryll Cashin, *The Failures of Integration: How Race and Class Are Undermining the American Dream* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); and Michelle Adams, “Radical Integration,” *California Law Review* 94 (2006): 261–311.

3. Elizabeth Anderson, *The Imperative of Integration* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2010). All page references are to Anderson’s book.

4. For Anderson, democratic ideals cannot be fully realized solely through equal political liberties, democratic elections and governance, and a fair opportunity to influence public decisions. There must also be a pervasive “democratic culture” of public discussion and deliberation in all institutions of civil society, where each citizen participates and each regards all others as equals. Public ends must reflect the well-formed collective will of the citizenry as a body. To fully realize these republican ideals, there must be, according to Anderson, comprehensive integration in social life and a diverse and inclusive political class. Otherwise, there will be cognitive deficiencies in deliberation, severe problems of accountability, and illegitimate hierarchy. She insists that these problems are created, in part, by segregation and thus prescribes integration as the remedy.

## II. NONIDEAL POLITICAL THEORY

In a brief opening manifesto, Anderson advances a new method for political philosophy, explicitly criticizing the dominant Rawlsian approach (pp. 3–7). Like Amartya Sen, she rejects the idea that ideal theory is an indispensable practical guide and necessary normative foundation for nonideal theory.<sup>5</sup> She argues that ideal theory relies on false empirical assumptions about human capacities and motivation and on inadequate factual claims about social processes and institutions. She maintains that our ideals, even our most fundamental principles, are fact-dependent in ways that ideal theory fails to recognize, and thus it will often be necessary to revise our ideals in light of new empirical evidence and discoveries. Like Charles Mills, Anderson insists that the limits of ideal theory are especially evident with respect to race-based injustices.<sup>6</sup> She maintains, for example, that some racial injustices are obscured or undiagnosed by the methods of ideal theory.<sup>7</sup>

I believe these objections to traditional Rawlsian theorizing can be answered, but I will not answer them here.<sup>8</sup> Instead, to better convey the

5. Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009).

6. See Charles W. Mills, *The Racial Contract* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Mills, “‘Ideal Theory’ as Ideology,” *Hypatia* 20 (2005): 165–84; and Mills, “Rawls on Race/Race in Rawls,” in “Race, Racism, and Liberalism in the Twenty-First Century,” ed. Bill E. Lawson, supplement, *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 47 (2009): 161–84.

7. Anderson claims that color-blind ideal theory would fail to diagnose the injustices embedded in the informal antiblack hostility in a neighborhood that deters a black person from moving in to that neighborhood (pp. 6–7). Though a black person may be able to afford to move in to the neighborhood, the expressive harm she would have to endure may be regarded as not worth the cost. As a result, she would miss out on the material advantages and social capital that living in that neighborhood would have afforded her and racial inequality is thereby reproduced.

However, in a well-ordered society this would not occur. In a fully just society, citizens voluntarily support the basic structure because they mutually recognize that it is just. It would be unjust to exclude blacks from desirable neighborhoods, even if antidiscrimination laws do not prohibit the hostile or unwelcoming behavior. In a fully just society, citizens recognize that equal standing does not depend on a person’s race. Anderson seems to be assuming that justice as fairness is compatible with racism circulating freely in civil society, where many observe the letter of the law but do not subscribe to the public reasons that justify the law.

8. For responses to these concerns about ideal theory, see Tommie Shelby, “Racial Realities and Corrective Justice: A Reply to Charles Mills,” *Critical Philosophy of Race* 1 (2013): 145–62; and Shelby, “Race and Social Justice: Rawlsian Considerations,” *Fordham*

substance of Anderson's view and the type of considerations offered in its defense, I will briefly discuss her description and application of her preferred alternative, which I will label the "medical model." On this model, the persistent cries of injustice and other grievances of members of society are conceived as symptoms (like headaches, fatigue, and insomnia) to be treated by empirically grounded interventions, which are conceived as potential cures for social ills. The justice doctor, concerned about the health of the polity, attempts to discover the "underlying causes of the complaints" (p. 4), which may differ, perhaps radically, from what those who initially raised the complaints believe is the proper diagnosis. After careful empirical analysis and social experiments, the linchpin of the social problem is identified and actions are taken to remove it, with the hope that the troubling symptoms eventually fade away and the patient is healed.

Within the medical model of nonideal theory, Anderson has her own version of reflective equilibrium (though she does not use that term). Ideals are not abstract, general, and (relatively) fact-independent standards for evaluating all societies (not even all modern democratic ones), and the relevant kind of reflection is not a thought experiment or an idealized conversation. Ideals, in her words, "embody imagined solutions to identified problems in a society" (p. 6). An ideal like integration is then a context-specific and concrete "hypothesis" to be tested in practice and against experience. We try it out to see if it solves the problem—for example, we see if people withdraw their claims of injustice and find the new form of life more satisfying. We could, of course, find that the proposed solution fails, and this may lead us to look for another remedy or to rethink whether we have properly identified the problem.

The medical model is open to a top-down social-engineering interpretation and a bottom-up democratic pragmatist one, as there are technocratic and populist moments throughout the treatise. In the more technocratic moments, Anderson seems to have in mind a set of social-scientific experts working in conjunction with political elites and institutional authorities who, in light of a "definitive diagnosis and

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*Law Review* 72 (2004): 1697–1714. See also A. John Simmons, "Ideal and Nonideal Theory," *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 38 (2010): 5–36; and Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift, "Ideal and Non-Ideal Theory," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Philosophy*, ed. David Estlund (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 373–89.

evaluation,” restructure basic social institutions in ways that push or nudge third-party social actors toward social justice (p. 3). Our motivational and cognitive tendencies are here viewed as levers that technocrats manipulate to direct us toward our common good (p. 4). Only those with expert social-scientific knowledge are in a position to devise the requisite principles of action, and thus it is natural that these experts should lead the reform effort. On this vision, technocrats develop policies to increase interracial contact in neighborhoods, workplaces, schools, and other social settings, as they believe this is necessary to repair the damage done to African Americans and to erase the social stigma they endure. The intervention’s aim is to restructure the racial demographics of social spaces in an effort to eliminate black disadvantages and create genuine racial equality.

In her more populist moments, Anderson can be read as suggesting that the intellectual arm of a (perhaps embryonic) social justice movement proposes a social-scientific analysis that diagnoses the problem (segregation) and suggests a solution (integration) that those in the movement, after due reflection and public dialogue, can decide whether to embrace or reject as they carry out their campaign for racial equality. Those offering the diagnosis and solution are not presumed to have essential esoteric knowledge about what justice requires, and ordinary participants, including the oppressed, are regarded as fully competent to judge what social justice demands, at least at the level of ideals and their application. Intellectual and political elites are deferred to, if at all, only with respect to the means that would realize these shared ideals. This interpretation would fit with Anderson’s claim that she is taking a broadly contractualist approach to assessing group relations—objectionable intergroup relations are ones governed by principles anyone implicated in these relations can reasonably reject (p. 17). However, this more populist approach is, as far as I can see, perfectly compatible with traditional nonideal theory.

But insofar as she is committed to a social-engineering interpretation of the medical model, Anderson’s method of nonideal theorizing may conflict with at least one aspect of the Rawlsian approach—namely, its commitment to public justification. Both sides can agree that black disadvantages raise fundamental social justice questions within nonideal political theory. Yet the basic ideals of justice, on the Rawlsian model, should be conceived as relatively independent of controversial social

theory. In our attempts to bring about social conditions that realize justice, sophisticated knowledge of empirical realities will of course be necessary, as we need to know what practical measures are most promising in this endeavor. There is no assumption, however, that the principles of justice are themselves unknowable without a detailed empirical analysis of current social realities. On the Rawlsian schema, both government officials and ordinary citizens have a duty to ensure that the social system of cooperation we all participate in is just. Moreover, this duty also extends to the oppressed, those most burdened by societal injustices. They should therefore be viewed not as passive victims awaiting elite remedies but as moral and political agents in their own right, social actors who are often consciously responding to the injustices that affect them. A technocratic vision of social justice would seem to marginalize the moral judgment and agency of the oppressed—that is, apart from viewing their grievances as defeasible indicators that some social ill needs to be addressed—as it would suggest that knowledge of what justice demands is largely out of their reach or beyond their understanding. I will return to this question in my assessment of Anderson’s theory.

### III. GROUP-BASED OPPRESSION AND SEGREGATION

Anderson’s explicit aim is to offer a theory, both explanatory and normative, of *group-based inequality*—the systematic disadvantage and subjugation of one social group in relation to a dominant group—in this case, black-white inequality in the United States. While she holds that only individuals, and not social groups as such, have claims to equal justice (p. 67), she insists that if we care about justice, we should be concerned not only with political illegitimacy, unequal liberties, and material inequalities, but also with *unjust relations between groups* (pp. 16–21). Unlike most contemporary Anglophone political philosophy, which tends to focus either on relations between the state and the individuals it claims authority over or on the distribution of material resources, *The Imperative of Integration* articulates a philosophical outlook that centers on intergroup relations. Indeed, for Anderson, whether inequalities (of whatever sort) are unjust depends on whether the relevant inequality is “causally connected to” or “implicated in” unjust intergroup relations, that is, whether it causes, is a consequence of, or embodies unjust intergroup relations (pp. 18–19, 67).

A *group relation* is a norm-governed practice or social habit by which one group interacts with or avoids another or by which one group affects the basic interests of another (p. 17). Such relations are unjust when they fail the test of contractualist acceptability. Unjust group relations constitute group-based *oppression* when they impose severe and systematic disadvantage on their victims. The principal oppressive group relations that Anderson outlines are those marked by marginalization, exploitation, powerlessness, violence, cultural imposition, and stigmatization (pp. 13–17).

Extending Charles Tilly's theory of inequality, Anderson argues that unjust group inequality is created and sustained by *social closure*—the set of practices a dominant group relies on to maintain monopolistic control over vital resources and opportunities and to prevent subordinate groups from gaining access to these important goods on fair terms.<sup>9</sup> These practices are diverse but interconnected. They include such measures as monopolizing the means of production and the means of warfare, exploiting the vulnerable, controlling state institutions, fraud and breach of contract, collusion and conspiracy, intolerance of cultural deviations from dominant norms, restricting the franchise to dominant group members, violence and intimidation, bias and discrimination, spreading stereotypes and legitimating ideologies, and segregation. While segregation is just one among many practices of social closure, it plays, according to Anderson, a special role in the maintenance of group inequality. It is the “linchpin” of group-based injustice and oppression (pp. 16, 25, 67, 136). Within unjust social schemes, segregation is a tool for keeping resources and opportunities in the hands of dominant-group members and out of the hands of subordinate-group members except on unfavorable terms.

For Anderson, segregation can be a *process* or a *condition* (pp. 9–10). Segregation processes are the practices or norms through which a group closes its social network to out-groups. *Spatial* segregation exists when those practices or norms apportion groups to different geographic or institutional spaces, while *role* segregation exists when persons are assigned to different social roles depending on their group identity. Two or more groups are in a segregated condition if their members are geographically or institutionally separated from each other or if their members occupy different social roles from other groups. Segregation

9. Charles Tilly, *Durable Inequality* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).



processes typically create segregated conditions (either spatial or role), though other processes can cause the condition of segregation.

Segregation (whether understood as a process or a condition) is not inherently unjust, says Anderson. It all depends on whether segregation causes, is caused by, or embodies unjust group inequalities or illegitimate group hierarchy. And this depends on whether a group is able to gain control over a critical resource (for example, power, wealth, jobs, or schools) and exclude others from fair access to the resource. Once a group acquires a virtual monopoly over important social goods, segregation may be all that is needed for the group to maintain its dominance.

Anderson treats “segregation” as a broad category. Unjust segregation can occur, for example, even when there is extensive intergroup contact and interaction, provided the groups play different social roles and one or more groups play a subordinate or demeaning role. Role segregation has more to do with domination, power, and status than blocked intergroup contact or spatial separation (p. 112). It is somewhat misleading, then, to label such hierarchical patterns of interracial interaction as “segregation,” despite their association with the Jim Crow regime. Their inclusion causes no real trouble, though, since Anderson’s main arguments for integration rest primarily on the significance of spatial segregation, particularly residential segregation.

#### IV. THE LINCHPIN THESIS

Racial segregation is, Anderson claims, the “linchpin” of oppressive and unjust social relations between blacks and whites. Yet there is some ambiguity in the linchpin claim. It is clear that we are to understand it as a causal hypothesis and that it implies segregation is somehow special among the various causes of racial inequality. It is also obvious that Anderson does not mean to make the implausible claim that integration, leaving all other social processes and conditions as they are, would be sufficient to end unjust racial inequality. Beyond this, though, I am not certain what the linchpin thesis means or implies.

On the interpretation that I will assume, the linchpin thesis claims that eliminating segregation is a necessary causal condition for ending unjust racial inequalities. There may be other practices that need to be addressed, but blacks will remain unjustly disadvantaged if segregation continues. Removing the malignant tumor may not cure the patient (as



she will also need chemotherapy, rest, and good luck), but she will not get well if the cancerous cells are not excised. This way of interpreting the linchpin claim does not make abolishing segregation special among the necessary social conditions for racial equality. It does, however, distinguish segregation from mere contributing or minor causes of racial inequality.

On a different reading of the claim (one that retains the idea that segregation is special), segregation is the structural element that holds the *system* of group inequality intact. While other practices and norms causally contribute to group-based injustice, segregation supports and links these causes, creating a complex scheme of subjugation that seriously burdens the oppressed. If segregation were eliminated, the other mechanisms of social closure would be less effective in reproducing black-white inequality, and what inequalities remained would be much more tractable. Thus, integration is an imperative of justice because, when realized, it undermines the foundation of systems of oppression.

Another way of interpreting the linchpin thesis is to view it as maintaining that (in the current era at least) segregation has a greater negative impact on blacks and on black-white relations than other mechanisms of social closure. Integration is an imperative, then, because it would do the most good in lifting black burdens and improving race relations. This interpretation is supported by one of Anderson's most explicit formulations of the linchpin thesis: "Segregation is the linchpin of unjust systematic race-based disadvantage because it blocks blacks' access to public and consumer goods, employment, and financial, human, social, and cultural capital and causes pervasive antiblack racial stigmatization and discrimination" (p. 136). However, Anderson also says, "The arguments of this book do not depend on the supposition that segregation is the sole, or even the overwhelming, cause of all of the disadvantages of the black community" (p. 43). She claims only that segregation is an "important" or "fundamental" cause of black-white inequality (pp. 43, 134, 162). Yet Anderson cannot establish her normative conclusions on the "important cause" supposition unless the analysis implies that eliminating segregation is an indispensable step in the effort to rectify racial injustices. If unjust racial inequality can be ended without racial integration, then integration is not an "imperative" of justice in any meaningful sense (though it may be a justice-promoting measure or welcome on other grounds).

But sometimes Anderson suggests not just that segregation is an important cause of racial inequality but that it is a more fundamental cause of race-based disadvantages than other important causes. For instance, after providing an illuminating account of contemporary racial discrimination and then explaining just how pervasive such discrimination is (pp. 57–63), she claims that segregation is a more fundamental cause of racial inequality than discrimination (p. 64).<sup>10</sup> This claim is puzzling. Since defending integration as an imperative of justice does not require such a strong (and difficult to prove) empirical claim, why not simply treat segregation and discrimination as two unjust tools of social closure that are sometimes used in combination? She already acknowledges that they are “mutually reinforcing” (p. 64). Instead, she makes the paradoxical claim that “discrimination is a tool of segregation” (p. 64). Yet it seems pretty clear, and Anderson herself affirms (pp. 68–69), that it was various forms of discrimination that created the *condition* of segregation. And the *processes* of segregation (both spatial and role) largely consist in discriminatory private acts and public policies. Moreover, discrimination (particularly employment discrimination) can cause racial inequality without relying on segregation, and not just vice versa, as Anderson implies (p. 66). After all, a lot of discrimination occurs in integrated social contexts (for example, in job promotion and termination).

Part of the reason Anderson insists that segregation is a more fundamental cause of racial inequality than discrimination is that she wants to reply to those who, after pointing to the sharp decline in overt racial discrimination, conclude that black disadvantages must therefore be caused (primarily) by black failings (for example, character flaws or cultural dysfunction). By arguing that segregation can cause racial inequality even in the absence of overt discrimination, she provides a convincing response to those who maintain that practices among whites are not responsible for blacks’ continuing disadvantages. This important

10. For Anderson, wrongful discrimination takes three forms. An action or a policy constitutes *prejudicial discrimination* when it denies a good to, or imposes a disadvantage on, someone on an invalid basis for treating people differently. *Statistical discrimination* is the use of generalizations that deny individuals a fair chance to show that they possess relevant traits that would justify equal or better treatment. *Evaluative discrimination* occurs when the discriminator’s judgment (perhaps unbeknown to him or her) has been impaired or distorted by stigmatizing ideas.

point is well worth emphasizing. But the causal primacy claim is not necessary to establish it. Anderson needs only to show that racial inequality is caused by numerous interacting unjust practices, not by discrimination alone. She could also rely on her claim that there are forms of wrongful discrimination more difficult to detect and defend against than legally proscribed prejudicial discrimination.

I doubt that much turns on disputes over which mechanism of social closure is the *most* fundamental. Whether racial justice requires integration does not depend on segregation being a more significant explanatory factor than discrimination. Integration could still be a valid imperative even if significant independent energy must also go into fighting discrimination. In other words, integration could be an imperative of racial justice even if there are other such imperatives. I will therefore ignore the explanatory primacy claim.

The thesis that integration would shake the foundations of racial oppression is an interesting social-theoretic claim. And, if true, perhaps we should give integration greater practical priority over other imperatives of justice, because were these integration efforts successful, this could potentially make achieving racial justice much easier. But these other measures, such as vigorous antidiscrimination enforcement and a more equitable distribution of wealth, would remain imperatives of justice. A similar thing is true of the claim that integration would have a greater positive impact on black life chances and black-white relations than other measures. We should surely prioritize actions that would do more good over those that would do less. Yet the ones that do less good may still be imperatives of justice. I will therefore leave aside the question of which imperatives of racial justice should have practical priority and treat the linchpin thesis as asserting that ending segregation is an important necessary condition for realizing social justice.

#### V. INTEGRATION AND JUSTICE

Anderson conceives of integration as “comprehensive intergroup association on terms of equality” (p. 112). She distinguishes this from three other ideals. In the fight against Jim Crow, many civil rights activists viewed their efforts as a struggle to achieve *desegregation*. The goal was to abolish the unjust legal exclusions and prohibitions of the segregation regime, a social system that granted whites privileges and advantages

they were not entitled to, deprived blacks of rights, opportunities, and resources they were owed, and stigmatized blacks as inferior. To prevent discrimination in housing, education, employment, and lending, anti-discrimination laws with effective mechanisms of enforcement were needed. There must be no race-based constraints on the use of public space, receipt of public benefits, or access to social services. One's race must not be an impediment to receiving due process or the equal protection of the law. In the political sphere, desegregation meant granting blacks the unfettered right to vote and to hold public office and the equitable sharing of political power and participation in public decision making. In the social sphere, each should possess the liberty to form and sustain intimate interracial bonds without the state or private individuals interfering with the exercise of this freedom. But desegregation, so understood, is compatible with voluntary self-segregation in civil society. Thus Anderson, while certainly committed to desegregation efforts, seeks something more.

Anderson also sharply distinguishes her conception of racial integration from the ideal of *color blindness*. Advocates of color blindness believe that all policies based on race, even race-conscious policies aimed at remedying unjust disadvantages, are unfair and destructive of civic bonds. Some proponents of color blindness also maintain that we should work to abolish racial identities and race-based group affinity. Anderson holds neither view and, in fact, offers a thorough refutation of the first (chap. 8).

*Assimilation* is sometimes equated with integration. If by "assimilation" one means a demand for conformity to dominant group norms, Anderson rejects it, as she regards this as demeaning to members of disadvantaged groups, who often legitimately seek to hold on to their distinctive social identities. But she does believe that all groups in society, however else they might differ, must conform to certain "norms of communication and comportment" if racial equality is to be achieved (p. 115). Those who fail to conform to this common cultural core will typically be marginalized and disadvantaged when attempting to participate fully in the political and economic life of society. Anderson thinks that integration, by bringing different groups into greater and sustained face-to-face contact, encourages this necessary assimilation through the reciprocal cultural exchange, adaptation, and emulation that sometimes occurs when people live, learn, work, and play together.

We should also distinguish Anderson's ideal of integration from the ideal of *interracial unity*: a society in which the members of different racial groups have a sense of goodwill toward one another and think of themselves as collectively constituting one people. According to this vision, we should strive for interracial civic friendship, a sense of fraternity among members of a multiracial society of equals. This unity is to be founded on mutual respect and understanding. It cannot be a matter of legal requirements alone but must be constituted by the shared and steadfast ethical commitment of individual members of society. Anderson shares this vision. This is not, however, the main basis for which she favors integration.

Integration could be thought of in much the same way many think of antidiscrimination—as a set of principles and policies for *preventing* injustices from occurring. Or it could be thought of as some think of affirmative action or reparations—as a set of principles and policies for *rectifying* disadvantages and harms caused by past injustices. Anderson, combining both normative standpoints, understands integration as a broad scheme of social reform designed to bring society into full compliance with what justice demands (though, as mentioned at the start, she rejects the idea that ideal principles of justice are needed to carry this program forward). She thus treats integration primarily as *a necessary instrument of corrective justice*.

According to Anderson, desegregation is insufficient to deal with racial inequality, because blacks are deeply disadvantaged by social and cultural capital deficits, which can be remedied only by greater black-white interaction (pp. 33–38).<sup>11</sup> *Social capital* is understood as the networks of associates through which knowledge of and access to opportunities are transmitted and norms of trust and reciprocity are enforced. She is particularly interested in social capital as a transmitter of valuable information. Social capital, like other forms of capital, is a kind of resource that can be used for socioeconomic advancement. *Bonding* social capital is ties between people who share an identity, while *bridging* social capital is ties between people who have different social identities. Anderson claims that segregation fosters strong

11. This position is also advanced in Patterson, *The Ordeal of Integration*; and Glenn C. Loury, *The Anatomy of Racial Inequality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002).

intra-racial bonding ties but undermines the building of interracial bridging ties. Indeed, she believes that “the tendency of blacks and whites to associate within largely segregated social networks” has profound negative consequences for black opportunity (p. 33). This is a problem of justice, she argues, because access to jobs and educational opportunities is often gained by word of mouth, and blacks have limited access to white social networks.

*Cultural capital* is facility in the norms and conventions that govern access to socioeconomic advantages (pp. 34–38). Anderson argues that since blacks and whites inhabit different social networks and spatial environments, this leads to divergent cultural patterns between the two groups, particularly with respect to communication styles and body language (p. 115). As a result, there is often friction and misunderstanding between blacks and whites because of their mutual ignorance of the subtleties of the other’s segregation-induced cultural ways. This mutual ignorance hurts black life chances because whites have disproportionate control over vital socioeconomic goods, and thus blacks tend to pay the costs of this mutual ignorance (for example, in the context of employment).

Anderson insists that unjust black-white inequality can be overcome fully only if blacks join white social networks so that bridging capital can be increased (with the result that whites give blacks vital information about employment and educational opportunities) and mutual ignorance of cultural differences is overcome (or there is a lessening of these cultural differences themselves). It is the need to increase black social and cultural capital that makes integration beyond desegregation an imperative.

#### VI. IMPERATIVE FOR WHOM?

The imperative of integration, as a practical prescription, could be addressed to at least three distinct sets of agents: lawmakers and government agencies (the state), whites (the dominant group with unfair advantages), or blacks (the disadvantaged group with legitimate claims for redress).<sup>12</sup> Anderson clearly means the imperative to apply to

12. I leave aside the role of those who are neither black nor white, as Anderson does not explicitly discuss this question. I also leave open the question of whether all the whites and blacks in question are “non-Hispanic.”

government action, and it is not to be understood as a mere welfare-promoting recommendation but as a requirement of justice. Therefore, the state may and should exercise its authority and power to see to it that integration occurs. In particular, the state should raise and use public funds and arrange penalties and incentives not only to prevent unjust exclusion and discrimination, but also to encourage sustained and frequent interracial sociospatial contact.

However, the required level of integration may not be fully achievable through legal requirements and public policy alone. The state's authority to interfere with our liberty has bounds, and its power to shape social dynamics is limited by what citizens are willing to countenance. In fact, Anderson is explicit that the bulk of the work of integration falls to the "spontaneous actions of citizens in civil society" (p. 189). Moreover, in speaking of integration as an "imperative of justice" (pp. 22, 112), she means that it is nonoptional. While the normative force of the imperative does depend on certain psychological, social, and material facts, including the history of race relations, it is not contingent on citizens' desires to see justice done or on their willingness to sacrifice to achieve just group relations. As she says, "Since all citizens have a duty to promote the justice of social arrangements, and integration is instrumental to justice, it is just to expect all citizens to bear their fair share of the costs of integration" (pp. 148–49). It is clear, then, that if whites (particularly those highly advantaged) refuse to respond to the call for integration, continuing to keep their distance from blacks, they would act unjustly, even if they were not liable to state penalty for this blameworthy moral failure.

But what about blacks? Anderson believes integration is not optional for blacks either. Integration is a tango—both whites and blacks must participate and coordinate their actions accordingly. What is more, in the context of a critique of black self-segregation, she says, "For blacks to achieve racial equality, blacks need to change, whites need to change, and we need to change. These changes can happen only through racial integration" (p. 186). Even more specifically, she says, "Racial equality therefore requires that blacks change, in that they acquire social and cultural capital that can be obtained only through social integration" (p. 186). So, given the universal duty to promote just social arrangements, blacks' choices that are incompatible with integration must be, on Anderson's account, contrary to their duty of justice.



## VII. NEIGHBORHOOD SELF-SEGREGATION

Anderson advocates extensive spatial integration, particularly in neighborhoods, schools, and workplaces. I will focus on neighborhood integration. Anderson believes that residential segregation has done great damage to blacks' life prospects and is a key contributor to the reproduction of racial inequality (pp. 25–31, 38–43).<sup>13</sup> Without neighborhood integration, school integration (except on token levels) will be difficult to achieve (pp. 126–27). Residence also affects access to employment, commercial goods and services, and public goods. Thus, neighborhood integration is central to Anderson's overall vision. She insists that desegregation efforts (for example, the lifting of legal barriers to intergroup contact and enforcement of antidiscrimination laws) are insufficient to prevent neighborhood segregation. So, inspired by social programs like Gautreaux and Moving To Opportunity, she advocates housing vouchers and other such measures to promote neighborhood integration (pp. 118–20).<sup>14</sup> And she believes that whites and blacks should abandon the practice of neighborhood self-segregation and seek out integrated communities.

Residential integration, for Anderson, is a corrective justice measure for dealing with racial inequality and spatially concentrated black disadvantage. The vision rests on the diagnosis that black-white inequality and ghetto poverty are partly the result of patterns of informal social

13. She is particularly influenced by Douglass S. Massey and Nancy A. Denton, *American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993), though she draws on numerous other studies.

14. Because of widespread discriminatory practices and a U.S. Supreme Court mandate (*Hills vs. Gautreaux*), the Chicago Housing Authority ran a mobility program from 1976 to 1998 whereby poor segregated blacks who met eligibility requirements (for example, small families, moderate debt, and acceptable housekeeping practices) could move to predominantly white or integrated metropolitan neighborhoods using housing certificates. Inspired by the results of Gautreaux, in 1992 the U.S. Congress authorized the Moving To Opportunity (MTO) housing voucher program and social experiment in five cities—Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. An experimental subgroup of eligible participants had to leave subsidized project-based housing in high-poverty neighborhoods (more than 40 percent poor) and move to neighborhoods with less than 10 percent poverty for at least one year. Though MTO did not have racial integration as its explicit aim (its focus was reducing concentrated poverty), it was a de facto integration program, since few black neighborhoods have low poverty rates, which meant that black participants almost always had to move, at least initially, to a white or integrated neighborhood to meet program requirements.

interaction and the cultural norms that people are exposed to (and not exposed to) in their neighborhoods. So it is not just that black neighborhoods are disadvantaged—for instance, that they have too few accessible and decent jobs, insufficient affordable housing, low-quality schools, poor public services, high crime rates, and so on (though this is clearly part of the problem). According to Anderson, existing social networks and cultural dynamics within and across neighborhoods mediate access to vital goods, opportunities, and services and thereby perpetuate black disadvantage.

Now, some blacks desire to live in integrated communities, want to garner the advantages associated with white neighborhoods, or seek to avoid the disadvantages typical of black ghettos. Despite discrimination and economic disadvantage, there are blacks, particularly those with higher incomes, who are able to act on such preferences and thus live in integrated or white neighborhoods.<sup>15</sup> But some residential choices of blacks arguably increase or maintain segregation. For example, some blacks avoid residing in white neighborhoods to limit unpleasant experiences with whites. The main concern is to elude interpersonal discrimination, racist treatment, and hostile attitudes.<sup>16</sup> Another reason is to avoid interracial conflict, which can, and generally does, reflect the operation of stereotypes and implicit bias but need not be motivated by hostility or animus.

There is also the positive preference for a black neighborhood. Group self-segregation need not be entirely voluntary, as it may be partly a response to unjust exclusion or economic disadvantage. But black self-segregation is still a choice, albeit a constrained one, when there are other acceptable options—for example, integrated

15. Wilson has famously argued that, after the fall of Jim Crow, many middle-class blacks migrated out of the ghetto into more advantaged, white suburban neighborhoods, leaving behind greater concentrations of the black poor in the central cities. See William Julius Wilson, *The Truly Disadvantaged* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987). See also Richard D. Alba, John R. Logan, and Brian J. Stults, "How Segregated Are Middle-Class African Americans?" *Social Problems* 47 (2000): 543–58; William A. V. Clark, "Race, Class, and Place: Evaluating Mobility Outcomes for African Americans," *Urban Affairs Review* 42 (2007): 295–314; and Patrick Sharkey, "Spatial Segmentation and the Black Middle Class," *American Journal of Sociology* 119 (2014): 903–54.

16. Lawrence Bobo and Camille L. Zubrinsky, "Attitudes on Residential Integration: Perceived Status Differences, Mere In-Group Preference, or Racial Prejudice?" *Social Forces* 74 (1996): 883–909.

neighborhoods or neighborhoods with few whites or blacks—which there sometimes are. We should also distinguish residential group self-segregation from *closing ranks*, that is, the defensive tactics a group uses to strengthen its internal social ties and to exclude outsiders from (full) affiliation. Both whites and blacks, dominant groups and subordinate groups, can close ranks. And residential self-segregation can itself be a way of closing ranks. However, residential self-segregation and closing ranks need not coincide. Blacks, for instance, control some organizations and may assign blacks and whites to different roles within them or exclude whites altogether; but many who participate in black organizations may live in integrated neighborhoods. There can be closed social institutions and organizations within an otherwise integrated neighborhood. And there can be the informal closure of ranks in an integrated neighborhood.

If a group largely controls an entire social domain (for example, employment, education, government administration, or real estate) and equal access to this domain is necessary for citizens to have equal civic standing and fair prospects in life, then closing ranks in that domain will naturally lead to serious injustices. But the problem is not closing ranks per se. The problem is that no group should be permitted to prevent others from gaining access to these vital goods and positions. And this is why it is dangerous for a social group to have a virtual monopoly over these goods and positions, for they may be tempted to exclude others from access to them, keeping these advantages within the group, or they may permit access but only on unfavorable terms. Blacks do sometimes engage in residential self-segregation and close their social networks to whites, including within black institutions and organizations. But they do not control sufficient resources or have enough power to prevent whites from gaining access to important goods and positions on fair terms.

Moreover, the permissibility of self-segregation and closing ranks depends not only on their actual or likely effects, but also on whether their *aims* can be given adequate justification. Blacks may sometimes engage in self-segregation or close ranks out of prejudice toward other groups. But often they engage in these practices to protect their shared interests in a society where they are deeply disadvantaged and vulnerable to mistreatment and political marginalization. When motivated by a sense of justice (rather than narrow group interests), these practices

express political solidarity.<sup>17</sup> Acting on considerations of solidarity, some blacks might seek to live in black neighborhoods where they can expect to find high concentrations of politically like-minded individuals. This black-politico concentration could enable them to influence local policies and to elect officials who will listen to their concerns and so is, in principle, an important source of political empowerment.

It is difficult to see how practices of self-segregation and social closure among whites could be reasonably thought to promote justice or protect the vulnerable and marginalized. Yet black solidarity is different, since it can be defended as a group-based effort to fight for racial justice or to protect the group's members from race-based maltreatment. The point of this self-segregation is not, then, to hoard advantages or to prevent nonblacks from gaining access to the things they need. It is rather a component of an ethic of resistance to injustice.<sup>18</sup>

Still, one can be committed to black solidarity without preferring to live in predominantly black neighborhoods or seeking black communal independence. Black solidarity could be expressed as a desire to live in neighborhoods with a *black critical mass* (25 to 50 percent) and therefore should not be confused with racial separatism.<sup>19</sup> Moderate concentrations of blacks in metropolitan neighborhoods could enable black social networks to flourish and black institutions to be sustained. However, most whites consider a neighborhood with a significant number of blacks to be intolerable or unappealing.<sup>20</sup> So blacks rarely have the opportunity to live in integrated neighborhoods with a black critical mass. They are usually forced to choose—that is, when they have a

17. Tommie Shelby, *We Who Are Dark: The Philosophical Foundations of Black Solidarity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2005).

18. See Tommie Shelby, "The Ethics of Uncle Tom's Children," *Critical Inquiry* 38 (2012): 513–32. See also Bernard R. Boxill, *Blacks and Social Justice* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992), chap. 8.

19. For a brief overview of black separatist arguments, see Howard McGary, *Race and Social Justice* (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell, 1999), chap. 3. See also Andrew Valls, "A Liberal Defense of Black Nationalism," *American Political Science Review* 104 (2010): 467–81.

20. See Kyle Crowder, "The Racial Context of White Mobility: An Individual-Level Assessment of the White Flight Hypothesis," *Social Science Research* 29 (2000): 223–57; Michael O. Emerson, Karen J. Chai, and George Yancey, "Does Race Matter in Residential Segregation? Exploring the Preferences of White Americans," *American Sociological Review* 66 (2001): 922–35; and Lincoln Quillian, "Why Is Black-White Residential Segregation So Persistent? Evidence on Three Theories from Migration Data," *Social Science Research* 31 (2002): 197–229.

choice at all—between segregated black neighborhoods and neighborhoods with very few or no blacks, and most prefer the former.<sup>21</sup>

A commitment to black solidarity should be distinguished from a desire for black *community*. Blacks, like members of religious or ethnic groups, often have an affinity for one another, and these valuable social ties sometimes express themselves as a desire to live together in the same neighborhoods.<sup>22</sup> But this desire for black residential community need not be politically motivated or conceived as resistance to injustice. It need not (though it might) be based on shared culture or lifestyle. Some blacks may simply desire the intrinsic pleasures and comfort that come from being around people with similar life experiences.<sup>23</sup> Or they may view black communities as places of refuge from unwelcoming, predominantly white workplaces and schools.

Blacks sometimes prefer neighborhoods with a black critical mass, not just because they want to avoid white hostility and interracial conflict, to practice political solidarity, to sustain black institutions, or to experience a sense of community, but because where there is a greater residential concentration of blacks there will also be a greater array of establishments and associations that cater to blacks' preferences and interests—for example, hair salons and barbershops, clothing stores, places of worship, restaurants, bookstores, cinemas, music and dance venues, art galleries and theaters, and retail outlets that sell black hair-care and skin-care products. Their status as a numerical minority makes it rational for them to cluster in neighborhoods so that they can benefit from establishments that cater to their distinctive tastes and needs.

These various reasons for choosing black neighborhoods, if acted on by a sufficient number of blacks, would contribute to, and maybe even worsen, segregation patterns. When such choices are motivated by racial bias and prejudice, they are clearly wrong and contrary to our duty of justice. But many of these reasons are perfectly legitimate and thus should not be dismissed in efforts to respond to black-white inequality.

21. Maria Krysan and Reynolds Farley, "The Residential Preferences of Blacks: Do They Explain Persistent Segregation?," *Social Forces* 80 (2002): 937–80.

22. See Iris Marion Young, *Inclusion and Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 6.

23. For more on this point, see Lawrence Blum, "Three Kinds of Race-Related Solidarity," *Journal of Social Philosophy* 38 (2007): 53–72.

## VIII. INTEGRATION OR EGALITARIAN PLURALISM?

Desegregation, including protecting the right of freedom of association, is a demand of justice. Interracial unity is an attractive ideal and perhaps should be a long-term goal. However, I believe that blacks should be free to self-segregate in neighborhoods and that this practice is not incompatible with justice. I also reject residential integration as a mechanism for correcting the unjust disadvantages of blacks, at least where programs like Gautreaux and Moving To Opportunity are the paradigm. Even if we were confident that integration would enhance just group relations and eliminate black disadvantage, we would still need to know that integration policies could be adequately justified in light of (a) their costs and risks for blacks and (b) the legitimate counterclaims of blacks. Any advocacy of integration as corrective justice must give proper weight to the reasonable concerns of blacks themselves. And it is here that Anderson's theory runs into problems.

For instance, she quickly dismisses black nationalism right from the start (pp. 1–2). Given their consistent and vigorous opposition to integration as a solution to black disadvantage and white dominance, black nationalists would have been natural interlocutors. Anderson justifies this dismissal on the ground that black nationalists are preoccupied with identity recognition rather than distributive justice, and so have no practical solution to blacks' material disadvantages. However, this tendency to overemphasize recognition and ignore distribution is not characteristic of left-wing black nationalists, who have always been deeply concerned not only with racial subjugation but also with class subordination and imperialism and have demanded redress of material inequality as compensatory justice.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, debates between black nationalists and their opponents frequently take up questions of integration versus separation and assimilation versus pluralism, as these have often been at the center of discussions about the black condition in U.S. society from slavery to the present. And, most importantly, a vision of racial justice in

24. For more on this point, see Rod Bush, *We Are Not What We Seem: Black Nationalism and Class Struggle in the American Century* (New York: NYU Press, 2000); Nikhil Pal Singh, *Black Is a Country: Race and the Unfinished Struggle for Democracy*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004); Peniel E. Joseph, *Waiting, til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power in America* (New York: Henry Holt, 2007); and Michael C. Dawson, *Blacks in and out of the Left* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2013).

America has emerged out of these debates that is not separatist, multiculturalist, or integrationist.

On this alternative *egalitarian pluralist* vision, racial justice requires desegregation and economic fairness but does not require residential integration or proscribe voluntary self-segregation in neighborhoods. Unjust race-based residential exclusion calls for an appropriate response, as do the socioeconomic disadvantages caused by racial injustice. Yet that response should be to prevent and rectify discriminatory treatment, to establish fair equality of opportunity, and to ensure an equitable distribution of income and economic assets. Consequently, blacks would be able to live in the neighborhoods of their choice, constrained only by what they can afford given their fair share of material resources. To the extent possible and in a way that is fair to all affected, we should work to improve the residential environment of the unjustly disadvantaged, that is, to make their *neighborhoods* less disadvantaged, but without aiming to rearrange neighborhood demographics by race. These corrective justice measures would inevitably require the investment of public funds and significant transfers of resources from the affluent to the disadvantaged. But this is perfectly consistent with justice. And, finally, egalitarian pluralists, in light of U.S. history, are generally skeptical that a sufficient number of whites are currently willing to relinquish their unjust social, material, and political advantages in order to secure racial equality. Thus, blacks must not only agitate for racial justice but, taking a realistic perspective on its prospects, organize as a group to protect their vital interests. In the history of black political thought, this outlook is perhaps most closely associated with thinkers such as W.E.B. Du Bois, Harold Cruse, and Derrick Bell.<sup>25</sup>

Anderson rejects this vision as inadequate, not because she regards it as too pessimistic, but because she believes it would likely lead to black self-segregation, which, she argues, would deprive disadvantaged blacks of opportunities to acquire needed social capital. However, in her desire

25. See W.E.B. Du Bois, *Dusk of Dawn: An Essay toward an Autobiography of a Race Concept* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 1984); Harold Cruse, *Plural But Equal: A Critical Study of Blacks and Minorities and America's Plural Society* (New York: William Morrow, 1987); and Derrick Bell, *And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice* (New York: Basic Books, 1987). For a recent comprehensive statement of this position, see Roy L. Brooks, *Integration or Separation? A Strategy for Racial Equality* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).



to see black bridging capital increase, she gives too little weight to the bonding capital that disadvantaged blacks already possess, social capital that would likely be lost by moving away from existing black neighbors.<sup>26</sup> Poor and working-class blacks are often dependent on their established social networks for child care, transportation, and employment information and referrals; and these networks are often rooted in particular neighborhoods.

In response, Anderson would likely emphasize that many, if not most, good jobs are in or near white neighborhoods, and access to these jobs often depends on being in local white social networks (pp. 27–28, 33–34).<sup>27</sup> However, two people can live in the same neighborhood—indeed, they can live right next door to each other—without forming social ties. The social capital argument assumes that blacks will form new bonds with whites when in more integrated neighborhoods.<sup>28</sup> But just because you live in the same neighborhood does not mean that your neighbors will invite you into their homes, vouch for you when it counts, share information with you that would advance your socioeconomic prospects, or even be friendly toward you. So blacks would have little assurance that sacrificing their bonding capital would lead to more valuable bridging capital.

Moreover, Anderson is relying on the assumption that increased social contact will improve the likelihood of social ties forming between

26. Mary Pattillo, “Investing in Poor Black Neighborhoods ‘As Is,’” in *Public Housing and the Legacy of Segregation*, ed. Margery Austin Turner, Susan J. Popkin, and Lynette Rawlings (Washington, D.C.: Urban Institute Press, 2009), pp. 31–46.

27. Sometimes the focus is on having “contacts” and sometimes it is on the *information* learned through people you know. Social ties can be useful because the people in our social networks can do us favors and vouch for us when it counts (for example, by providing job references). But if it is the *information* about employment opportunities that matters, then one can often get information (generally more reliable information) through other channels—for example, advertisements, employment websites, job centers, coworkers, classmates, teachers, and school guidance counselors. One need not rely on one’s neighbors.

28. There is evidence that such bridging bonds do not form. See Susan Clampet-Lundquist, “Moving Over or Moving Up? Short-Term Gains and Losses for Relocated HOPE VI Families,” *Journal of Policy Development and Research* 7 (2004): 57–80; and Mark Joseph, Robert Chaskin, and Henry Webber, “The Theoretical Basis for Addressing Poverty through Mixed-Income Development,” *Urban Affairs Review* 42 (2007): 369–409. For an overview of the evidence, see Edward G. Goetz and Karen Chapple, “You Gotta Move: Advancing the Debate on the Record of Dispersal,” *Housing Policy Debate* 20 (2010): 209–36.

whites and blacks (pp. 123–27). Where whites and blacks are equals or where advantaged whites are willing to sacrifice to realize racial equality, this is a plausible hypothesis. But if affluent whites maintain exclusive enclaves in order to hoard resources, hold on to their advantages, and avoid blacks, as Anderson insists they do, why should we expect them to share information with new black neighbors about job opportunities? Would they not also seek to limit contact with any black neighbors, particularly those from ghettos?

But let us suppose whites did not practice employment and housing discrimination, adequate schools were available to everyone, and an equitable distribution of material resources existed. Why, under these circumstances, would it be so important that whites and blacks live together in the same neighborhoods? After all, opportunities for interracial contact would exist in workplaces, in the marketplace, and in educational contexts.<sup>29</sup> There would also be opportunities for interracial contact and communication in the broader public sphere, in recreational contexts, and in other public spaces. In recent years, many social networks are cultivated and sustained online through social media. However, blacks might still have legitimate reasons for preferring to live in black neighborhoods—to maintain a sense of community, to sustain black institutions and cultural practices, and to ensure access to establishments that serve black needs.

Anderson might here insist that despite these other opportunities for interracial interaction, social capital deficits would remain if blacks self-segregate in neighborhoods and thus racial injustices would be left uncorrected.<sup>30</sup> But would they? Let us suppose that, after the egalitarian pluralist vision has been fully realized and whites demonstrate their willingness to integrate, some racial inequalities remain because blacks forgo the social capital advantages that greater integration would afford

29. Of course, if eligibility to attend a public school depends on residence in the surrounding neighborhood and neighborhoods are segregated, then public schools will not be locales for interracial interaction, at least not between students.

30. I must confess that I find the idea of social relationships as socioeconomic resources and levers for advancement a bit distasteful. I would not deny that people rely on their relationships for information and favors that could improve their socioeconomic prospects. But I see this as a *by-product* of social relationships, not as one of their primary functions. When people choose their relationships on the basis of the potential associate's socioeconomic usefulness, this strikes me as perversion of association. I will not press this objection, however.

them. Would this mean racial justice was not realized? No. Blacks would have the real option of participating in interracial social networks and, consequently, would have no reasonable basis for complaint. Contractualist requirements would be met. There is, in short, a difference between saying that justice requires that obstacles to integration be removed so that individuals have the *option* to integrate (which is the demand for desegregation) and saying that justice requires that individuals *actually* integrate.

The cultural capital argument fares no better. A lack of cultural capital can certainly hurt individuals' socioeconomic prospects. This consideration is not, however, decisive in favor of integration.<sup>31</sup> The cultural capital argument has force only if (a) there are cultural habits necessary for socioeconomic well-being that can be acquired through informal social interaction but not in formal educational contexts, (b) these habits cannot be established and maintained in black social environments, and (c) blacks who have an opportunity to acquire these habits through integration but do not take advantage of it cannot fairly complain if their socioeconomic fortunes are diminished as a result. There are reasons to doubt all three claims.

Many would insist that these vital cultural habits could be learned, for example, in schools and training programs.<sup>32</sup> To take some examples of cultural capital deficits that Anderson mentions (pp. 35–38), I see no reason to believe that disadvantaged blacks could not be taught to speak Standard American English, to smile and dress appropriately at job interviews, and to be less direct when talking to whites. It may be *easier* to cultivate these and other relevant cultural habits by simply growing up

31. The cultural capital argument for integration might initially seem compelling, but only because Anderson characterizes cultural capital in a way that begs the question against the value of black self-segregation. For her, cultural capital is the set of "cultural habits acquired by adaptation to the social environment" that enable one to succeed in that environment (p. 35). This suggests that if the relevant cultural habits needed for mainstream success are not firmly established in one's neighborhood, one cannot "adapt" to them and thus will fail to acquire them. Yet it is not clear why the *etiology* of the cultural habits is crucial to the function of these habits as cultural capital.

32. See Lisa D. Delpit, "The Silenced Dialogue: Power and Pedagogy in Educating Other People's Children," *Harvard Educational Review* 58 (1988): 280–98; and Orlando Patterson and Jacqueline Rivers, " 'Try On the Outfit and Just See How It Works': The Psycho-Cultural Responses of Disconnected Youth to Work," in *The Cultural Matrix: Understanding Black Youth*, ed. Orlando Patterson and Ethan Fosse (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, forthcoming).

with and living around people who already have them and thus absorbing these habits without making a conscious effort. But some may be willing to travel a more difficult route to acquire these useful habits if it means they can avoid hostile residential environments or can live in black neighborhoods.

It also seems plausible that blacks could acquire the necessary cultural capital in black environments (for example, mixed-income black neighborhoods, black colleges and universities, predominantly black K–12 schools, black civic organizations, and black boys and girls clubs), particularly if the egalitarian pluralist vision were realized. Indeed, if there were better economic opportunities, less crime and violence, and good schools in or near black neighborhoods, more higher-income blacks (who presumably already have the requisite cultural capital) might be prepared to move to or remain in these neighborhoods, thus making their cultural capital available to more disadvantaged blacks.

We should also be highly skeptical of cultural habits and norms that mediate access to fundamental opportunities (such as employment) but that cannot be learned in schools, in job-training programs, or on the job. When habits and conventions are not taught in formal educational and training contexts and yet are treated (if only implicitly) by dominant group members as employment qualifications, we have *prima facie* reason to regard these cultural traits as troubling modes of exclusion, if not wrongful discrimination.<sup>33</sup> Cultural capital, when it takes the form of tastes and styles embraced by elites, can function as symbolic assets that elites exploit to highlight their distinctiveness, to foster in-group cohesion, and to exclude others from access to their advantages.<sup>34</sup> While blacks may lack forms of cultural capital that would aid their socioeconomic prospects in a world dominated by white elites, blacks' lack of certain forms of cultural capital (for example, their lack of appreciation for the expressive arts white elites take pleasure in, their different tastes in clothes, and their tendency to wear hairstyles that make whites uncomfortable) should not, as a matter of fairness, impede their socioeconomic advancement. So-called cultural fit should not be treated as a

33. Paul DiMaggio, "Cultural Capital and School Success: The Impact of Status Culture Participation on the Grades of U.S. High School Students," *American Sociological Review* 47 (1982): 189–201.

34. Pierre Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984).

qualification for employment when it has no bearing on job competence. To concede the legitimacy of these cultural barriers to opportunity would be to acquiesce in injustice.

However, some of the suboptimal cultural habits Anderson discusses (for example, the menacing “game face” that deters predators and ghetto-specific dialect) are characteristic not of blacks as a group but only of some severely disadvantaged people who live in poor urban neighborhoods.<sup>35</sup> Her argument that these cultural traits reduce blacks’ socioeconomic prospects is really an argument against concentrated disadvantage in ghettos, not against black neighborhoods or black social networks.

I also suspect that Anderson exaggerates the degree to which the average black person is ignorant of upper-middle-class white cultural habits and expectations. For generations, black survival has depended on learning and complying with these norms and so blacks are often highly motivated to acquire the cultural habits that will allow them to advance in a white-dominated world. When blacks do not exhibit these acceptable cultural markers, this is sometimes a form of defiance or a way of affirming their identity in the face of black denigration. They are sometimes prepared to pay the costs of their cultural transgressions and knowingly upset these expectations, which they often regard as unreasonable. The cultural capital problem, to the extent that there is one, could therefore be rooted in racial prejudice, unequal political power, economic unfairness, and inadequate schools rather than in residential segregation. The fundamental problem might simply be that blacks are often at the mercy of whites’ arbitrary cultural tastes and must conform to white expectations (or at least appear to) if they are to succeed.

#### IX. SOCIAL SCIENCE, FEASIBILITY, AND THE DUTY OF JUSTICE

In response to these objections and skeptical remarks, Anderson might reply that the weight of the empirical evidence is on her side and that, in fact, blacks do need to integrate more fully with whites if unjust racial inequalities are to be entirely overcome. Perhaps she would be correct. However, she tends to treat the empirical claims she relies upon as

35. See William J. Wilson, *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor* (New York: Knopf, 1999), chap. 3; and Elijah Anderson, *Code of the Street: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City* (New York: Norton, 1999).

virtually certain and well established. And this brings me back to my general concern about the technocratic moments in her text. For while there is a great deal of agreement among social scientists that segregation processes (particularly discriminatory ones) create and worsen racial inequality, there is much disagreement about whether and how much integration efforts would reduce such inequality.<sup>36</sup> Given that there is conflicting empirical evidence, that the evidence is highly complex and thus difficult to assess, and that such empirical studies are rarely if ever conclusive, it seems that Anderson should treat the linchpin hypothesis as, at best, probable. In light of this reasonable disagreement and ineradicable empirical uncertainty, her practical prescriptions should also be more tentative and qualified. Instead, she sometimes treats the evidence in favor of integration as decisive and suggests that this evidence entitles state officials and institutional authorities to override the residential preferences and associational prerogatives of blacks who reject integration.

But let us suppose that, in her more democratic populist mood, she puts her case directly to disadvantaged blacks (rather than solely to bureaucrats or policymakers) and they reject her prescriptions. Even if she is *correct* about the weight of the evidence, I do not think these blacks would be acting contrary to their duty of justice if, remaining skeptical, they nevertheless practiced self-segregation. Indeed, blacks would be acting under tremendous uncertainty even if they were persuaded by her social analysis. They could not be confident that things will work out as she expects. Consequently, disadvantaged blacks would understandably want to take precautions, to protect themselves from potential costs or unforeseen consequences. If some blacks refuse to go along with integration efforts, this may be because of reasonable disagreement about whether these efforts will actually remedy the problem and may thus

36. See, for example, the essays in Chester Hartman and Gregory D. Squires, eds., *The Integration Debate: Competing Futures for American Cities* (New York: Routledge, 2010). See also the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development's final impacts assessment of the Moving To Opportunity experiment (2011): [www.huduser.org/portal/publications/pubasst/mtofhhd.html](http://www.huduser.org/portal/publications/pubasst/mtofhhd.html). The investigators report: "Families in the experimental group did not experience better employment or income outcomes than the other families. The children in the section 8 and experimental groups did not have better educational achievements than those in the control group and were not significantly less likely to engage in most forms of risky or criminal behavior."

reflect neither an unwillingness to honor their duty of justice nor hostility toward whites.<sup>37</sup>

One known cost of residential integration is greater racial conflict, which causes blacks to experience stress and alienation. With more interracial contact, which increases the chances that they will interact with racist whites, blacks also experience more racially motivated discrimination, hostility, harassment, and even violence. Anderson acknowledges these costs (pp. 180–83). She is also explicit that integration would cause “the loss or alteration” of black institutions (p. 180). And though she recognizes that blacks sometimes need places of refuge and settings for black in-group affiliation, she proclaims, “It is time to strike a new balance between moments of self-segregation and of integration, decidedly in favor of the racially inclusive ‘us’ ” (pp. 188–89). In particular, Anderson does not believe that neighborhoods are permissible settings for black self-segregation, except perhaps for some limited “racial clustering” (p. 113).<sup>38</sup> She insists that, over time, integration will help whites and blacks learn less conflict-ridden modes of interracial interaction (pp. 182–83).

This reply to the concern that integration would require blacks to carry unreasonable burdens and risks is not, however, really responsive to the worry. The concern is not just that integration, even with time, will fail to make interracial interaction smoother and less costly to blacks. The concern is that blacks, an already disadvantaged group, will have to carry these burdens in the meantime, particularly when a positive result from their sacrifice is far from certain. If a suitable alternative is available that does not entail these costs but is compatible with justice, then blacks could reasonably insist that we experiment with that one first.

This conclusion might be rejected on the grounds that blacks, like everyone else, have a duty to resist racism and that such antiracist efforts will not succeed without greater integration than the egalitarian pluralist position demands. Anderson thinks that even if all (or almost all) whites were to sincerely reject conscious racism, they would not be

37. Rawls’s remarks about the “burdens of judgment” are relevant here. John Rawls, *Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), pp. 54–58.

38. As mentioned earlier, some blacks would be satisfied with a critical mass of blacks in an otherwise integrated neighborhood. But these kinds of neighborhoods are difficult to sustain, as whites tend to leave these neighborhoods when “too many” blacks come to reside there? So “racial clustering” is rarely an option.



able to overcome their implicit racial bias against blacks unless whites and blacks became more integrated (pp. 186–87). Whites need to spend more sustained time interacting with blacks to fully overcome unconscious stigmatizing ideas. And so some subtle discrimination would remain if blacks insisted on residential self-segregation. But would it be contrary to blacks' duty of justice if they were to refuse to play this role in the moral reform of whites? It would depend, I think, on the conditions under which they would be expected to play it. If Anderson thinks that blacks should play this role *now*, before they have assurances that conscious racism and intentional practices of social exclusion have been rejected, then the demand is unreasonable. Disadvantaged blacks are too vulnerable and the costs and risks too great to expect blacks to forgo the option of self-segregation. The duty of justice does not require such self-sacrifice and heroism. But once it was clear that whites sought to live in a racially just society even if this would mean losing some of their existing advantages, I suspect that a great number of blacks would, in the spirit of reciprocity, seek out opportunities for greater interracial interaction.<sup>39</sup>

In the meantime, given that blacks are already concentrated in metropolitan neighborhoods and few whites are eager to join these communities, why not simply attempt to create black communities that are not disadvantaged, working to realize racial justice without insisting on residential integration? Anderson thinks this is not possible, regarding the hope as an "illusion" (p. 2). Part of her reason for thinking this is based on her social and cultural capital arguments and on worries about the persistence of white unconscious bias, considerations already discussed. But, setting aside those arguments, we can ask, is egalitarian pluralism unrealistic? There is a sense in which thriving black communities might be a utopian fantasy, in that powerful whites will not let it happen because that effort would cost them more than they want to pay. For instance, Anderson notes that state-sponsored K–12 school integration initiatives "consistently encounter massive white resistance and are not politically feasible" (p. 189). However, this cannot be the kind of feasibility Anderson has in mind when she insists that integration is the only

39. For some empirical support for this speculation, see Jacob S. Rugh and Douglas S. Massey, "Segregation in Post-Civil Rights America: Stalled Integration or End of the Segregated Century?" *Du Bois Review/FirstView* (2013): 1–28.

viable path to racial justice because, on her account, white intransigence in the face of manifest racial inequality and severe black disadvantage is clearly unjust and unreasonable (p. 190). The kind of “realism” in political philosophy that she favors does not entail capitulating to injustice. Moreover, most whites are also unlikely to accept the comprehensive integration that Anderson prescribes, for this too would cost them more than they are willing to pay. Indeed, it is not obvious that most whites would prefer residential integration to improving black communities. After all, the latter alternative allows them to limit their contact with blacks. To be sure, an egalitarian pluralist American society is not on the horizon. But Anderson admits that the prospects for realizing her integrationist vision are also “gloomy” (p. 189).

Yet even if there is no suitable alternative to integration that would erase all unjust black disadvantages, as Anderson maintains, it is not clear that blacks have a duty to accept the burdens of integration, much less that the state has a right to impose them. A better response to the costs objection is to insist that integration be voluntary, with real freedom to choose one’s residential community: those blacks who wish to bear the costs of integration should be enabled to integrate, but those who do not want to should be neither pushed into residential integration nor criticized for not integrating.<sup>40</sup> In other words, we should embrace the egalitarian pluralist vision.

If the imperative of integration entails that blacks must relinquish the benefits of self-segregation, must endure the increased white hostility and interracial conflict that often accompany integration, and, in order to have equal life prospects, should work their way into white social networks and submit to white cultural norms, then blacks have just grounds for complaint. Blacks, as an unjustly disadvantaged group, should be the ones to decide if forgoing the returns to social and cultural capital that integration might provide is worth it to them. Policies that seek to end unjust racial inequality by pushing, or even nudging, blacks into residential integration or that make needed resources available only on the condition that blacks are willing to integrate show a lack of respect

40. Of course, one cannot literally choose the racial demographics of one’s neighborhood. The racial composition of a neighborhood depends on the choices of others to join or exit it. One can choose to live in or leave a neighborhood because of its current or projected racial demographics. But others have a right to join or exit it too, thus perhaps upsetting one’s preferred racial composition.

for those it intends to assist. In response to such reform efforts, it would be perfectly reasonable for blacks to refuse to move out of black communities—whether these are ghettos or not—as a form of resistance or political dissent.<sup>41</sup>

#### X. CODA: ON INTERRACIAL UNITY

It might seem that in defending the legitimacy of black neighborhood self-segregation and in rejecting residential integration as a requirement of justice I am also abandoning the ideal of interracial unity that Martin Luther King Jr. so eloquently defended.<sup>42</sup> Anderson's theory could be read as closer to King's majestic vision and therefore more attractive. She claims, for example, that justice requires the cultivation of a multiracial national identity as citizens, for it is only from the perspective of this collective "we" that we can properly frame political goals and select appropriate policies (p. 184). This means, she claims, that racial identity cannot have priority over national identity. Indeed, sometimes

41. When it comes to correcting injustices, some hold that our interventions should not add to the burdens of the oppressed. Since integration would burden disadvantaged blacks, we should not promote it, they maintain. See, for example, V. Denise James, "The Burdens of Integration," *Symposium on Gender, Race and Philosophy* 9 (2013). This principle is too strong. It would rule out activism against a group-based injustice if such activism would create a backlash against the disadvantaged group. It would also rule out state interventions that add to the burdens of the oppressed in some ways but relieve their burdens in others, creating a net gain for the oppressed. The principle I am relying on is weaker. I hold that we should, whenever possible, avoid adding to the burdens of the oppressed. But when we cannot achieve justice without adding to their burdens, we should keep these costs to a minimum and give the oppressed maximal freedom in choosing the form that these necessary burdens take. We should also be sure to share the burdens of redress equitably, with the "winners" in the unjust system paying the lion's share of the cost of reform. The duty to redress injustice falls to us all, the disadvantaged and the privileged. So it is not unfair that the oppressed pay some of the costs of social reform. However, some costs, like loss of self-respect, should never be imposed on the oppressed, as this would be an attack on their moral standing. Other burdens, such as being made more vulnerable to unjust treatment and hostility, which integration would likely involve, should be imposed only when absolutely necessary, with provisions that allow the most oppressed to opt out if possible.

42. Martin Luther King Jr., "The Ethical Demands for Integration," in *A Testament of Hope: The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther King Jr.*, ed. James M. Washington (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 117–25. I discuss King's vision of racial justice (and criticize Barack Obama's) in Tommy Shelby, "Justice and Racial Conciliation: Two Visions," *Daedalus* 140 (2011): 95–107.

Anderson seems committed to the view that the national “we” must take priority over the ethnoracial “we” even when the polity is grossly unjust (pp. 188–89).

However, if the basic structure is deeply unjust and the burdens of injustice have fallen heavily and disproportionately on a stigmatized racial group (as Anderson herself argues is true of blacks in America), then it is entirely appropriate for that oppressed group to withhold some allegiance to the nation and to invest more in cultivating solidarity and mutual aid within the group, simply as a matter of self-defense and group survival. Full identification with and loyalty to the nation will naturally come as the people of the nation demonstrate a commitment to equal justice by removing the unfair burdens on the oppressed. The existence of black ghettos and exclusive white suburban communities across America’s metropolises is a salient reminder that this commitment has yet to be adequately undertaken.

On Anderson’s medical approach to corrective justice (at least on the technocratic interpretation), the state should act to cultivate an integrationist ethos among its citizens by bringing different racial groups into greater residential proximity, creating more opportunities for interracial interaction. The justification is that only in this way can true racial equality be created and the vestiges of white supremacy be eliminated. Against this view, I hold that an integrationist ethos—a pervasive sense of interracial unity—is a natural *by-product* of a just multiracial society of equals. And residential integration is not a necessary means to such a society but would likely be a consequence of a just social structure. Our emancipatory aim should be, therefore, to establish such a structure, not to artificially engineer multiracial neighborhoods in the name of national unity.<sup>43</sup>

43. While I embrace King’s vision of interracial unity, the position I have been defending is, in some ways, at odds with his idea of redemptive suffering—the Christian-inspired notion that the suffering of righteous agents of social change can transform the moral consciousness of those on the wrong side of justice. But the resolution of that dispute will have to wait for another day.